

1 Introduction

The Impact of Racism

To be black in a white world is an agony. This is because the white world is racist – if you are black, you are seldom allowed to be an ordinary, regular human being. Instead, at every turn you are confronted by hidden stereotypes that can spring to life in a flash, push violently into you, destabilize you and make you think, feel and act in ways that are wholly determined from the outside, as if you yourself had no say in the matter. This can turn even the most innocuous of situations utterly fraught.

Here is an example of one such moment recounted by a British actor, comedian and broadcaster:

Sanjeev Bhaskar got his first taste of a traditional British curry house – and of the traditional British attitudes sometimes on the menu alongside the chicken tikka masala – when he was a business studies student at Hatfield Polytechnic. He'd gone out with a group of mates to an Indian restaurant. The menu had been passed round, the lagers and poppadums ordered. Then attention turned to the one non-white person in the room who wasn't a waiter.

“It is one of the most uncomfortable experiences I've had in a restaurant,” recalls Bhaskar. “Somebody said to me: ‘Well you'll obviously order the hottest thing on the menu.’ And I felt tricked into ordering it. Obviously, in my mind it was me in an Indian restaurant. But to everyone else I was an Indian in an Indian restaurant. And at that point I suddenly became aware of who I was and how unpleasant it all was.”

It had never occurred to Bhaskar before that the heat of a curry was an indication of anything other than how long it had been on the boil. It hadn't really sunk in – despite... having endured a pretty tough time at school – that to many

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of those around him he wasn't just another bloke, another student. He was foreign, different. (Graf, 2007, p. 48)

The setting for this incident could hardly be more routine and ordinary. Yet the effect of that single remark, "Well you'll obviously order the hottest thing on the menu," transforms things totally. It is as if a chasm momentarily opens up in Bhaskar's mind, allowing someone else's idea of what he wants to enter – to lodge itself there, to seize control of his voice and to speak *in his own voice* – so that there can be no denying that the preference being uttered is his.

A mere fraction of a second later the deed is done and things return to normal. Now he can observe with his own eyes what has just taken place, and what he sees is shocking: in the deftest way possible he has been put back into his proper place – that of a black foreigner in a white land. Where has he been not to have recognized this fact before? Has he been deluded, thinking of himself as an Englishman? On the outside, meanwhile, the bonhomie among equals continues, his white companions apparently unaware of the drama taking place inside him.

What does one do in a situation like this? Were he to halt the proceedings and confront his assailant, he risks being seen as an Indian with a chip on his shoulder about race. The other person was, after all, asking an innocent question that Bhaskar's hypersensitivity about his race/culture, now revealed, has blown out of all proportion. This confirms that the problem is in *his* mind, not in that of his assailant. Were he to let it pass, on the other hand – as he did – he stands accused of keeping quiet about what is, after all, the kind of categorization that ends in the openly racist refrain, "Paki Go Home!" Again, the problem – now, guilt associated with racism – is in *his* mind. Following the incident, therefore, a quiet life is out of the question as far as the victim is concerned. Alone in company, it is Bhaskar who is left to process the experience of how "unpleasant it was to be him", whilst his assailant is free to move on.

It is worth noting that to characterize this as "one of the most uncomfortable experiences I've had in a restaurant" hardly does justice to what has taken place. Replayed in slow motion and viewed close-up, as I have just done, it becomes clear that we are dealing with nothing short of a psychotic moment. A rupture in the continuity of his being – that ongoing sense we all have of

being more or less in control of our insides, of what uniquely sets “me” apart from “them”, which underpins our capacity to be with others – has taken place, allowing the other to march in and to take possession of the self. This is a serious matter, especially when the interchange takes place in a white world where power cleaves along the colour line. Writing in another time and place, Frantz Fanon (1952) characterized this use of one’s blackness – one’s difference from the white – as forcefully tossing the black person into an arid area of non-being from which he has, somehow, to gather together once more the now-fractured strands of his being.

Let me relate another incident that can help flesh out further what is involved. You are driving along in your perfectly unremarkable car when a policeman stops you on a technicality – say, one of your tail lights isn’t working. You sense trouble: you are bound to get a ticket, an on-the-spot fine, or be required to produce evidence of a working tail light within days, which is, at the very least, a nuisance. An apology is worth a try. So you explain that you were unaware of the fact and are grateful to him for having alerted you to it. You will have it put right forthwith. Might politeness elicit kindness in return? Might you be let off with a warning, bringing things to a speedy conclusion? Who knows?

His face, however, tells you he is unmoved. He wants to see your driving licence, the car’s certificate of roadworthiness and your motor insurance papers, all of which the law requires you to produce on request, though hardly anyone carries them. You have only one of them, so you’re in the wrong again. Will this make it worse? It turns out that this second offence occasions meticulous scrutiny of the piece of paper that you do have ostensibly to confirm your identity and so on. But why – surely he can’t be thinking this clapped-out old banger is a stolen car? Once he is done with you, however, the car itself turns into an object of intense suspicion – registration details are relayed back to base, and then he goes through it literally from bumper to bumper. Can he be looking for drugs? Surely not!

As this charade goes on and on, you become convinced that you have, unfortunately, been singled out to be his victim in today’s power game. Rage, which builds, has to be checked, for you notice that the clock has ticked and you are now in

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danger of being late for your next appointment. You must avoid unnecessary delay. Don't make a fuss. If you lose your cool (as you feel like doing), you will probably just provoke him further. You recall hearing that blacks are often arrested for "obstructing police officers in performing their duty", so you shut up hoping that, at the very least, this will not complicate matters further.

In addition, there is an almost palpable sense that he is aware of your discomfort and is enjoying it: is that summons for you to produce the missing paperwork not being filled out painstakingly slowly? "Can you please spell that again for me, sir?", "No sir, I am required to complete this form myself." It dawns on you that clemency is having the day off and, with the die cast, you throw caution to the wind and object to the delay, saying that you have to see a patient at your clinic in a few minutes. And now, with a distinct note of triumph, he trumps you with, "Sorry sir, it's the law." And, are you imagining it or has the checking and rechecking of details become even more cumbersome? By the end of this, you feel truly done over and put in your place: that of a black outsider who dared to presume that you could be a regular citizen of a multi-cultural European metropolis. Who did you think you were? And that ignites a seething cauldron that rocks you to the core, leaving you feeling that you could easily join a mob on a wild rampage against the sheer injustice of it all.

When you speak to your friends you realize that blacks and whites react differently. Blacks seem to know what you are talking about, but seem amazed that you expect them to revisit something so utterly awful that, if one had any sense, it would be best to leave it be. Light-hearted banter and laughter are medicines of choice. "It happens every day", "Don't take it so personally", "We are brothers in this together", or, more seriously, "When push comes to shove they are basically against us. We know that, though many whites pretend otherwise", "We'll always be outcasts", and "It's just the way the world is, bro". A paranoid view seems to suffice, and when you challenge this, you are met with, "True, but nothing will ever change, will it, so why bother?"

White friends, on the other hand, seem a little too willing to show how aware they are of such troubling outrages on the street, and want to think seriously about them. No, they do not

think the police would treat a white person in that way – though the police themselves would dispute this – and yes, an element of racism must be at play. Some police are out-and-out racists. But is it race? Perhaps the police are just morons who prey on any vulnerable group. Your more sophisticated friends suggest that these officers, lower middle class at best, compensate for their own inferiority by abusing their authority in order to lord it over blacks and so on. Or, they may just be plain envious – why tell them you work in a clinic but not as a cleaner?

Such conversations feel manic: they fill your head with a whirl of ideas that pull you out of your misery. But has political correctness crept in? Are you to take comfort from the idea that *we* are vastly superior to *them*, thereby not resolving your problem but relocating it – in them? Where the policeman forcefully pushed you out, your white friends invite you in, offering *you* the comfort of belonging and pushing *them* out into the underworld of idiots where they belong. But, unlike your black friends' offer, this one seems forced. They seem to be trying too hard to empathize with you, to establish common ground, to show that they too know what it is like to come up against blind prejudice. But do they? Is their tone not a little too condemnatory? Does it cover up guilt over the fact that the police would not treat *them* like that, which threatens to expose the fact that *you* and *they* do not make *we*? That you are on different sides of the black–white divide? Anyhow, you realize that talking and thinking have taken the place of a knowing that, by being grounded in lived experience, might just bring true peace of mind.

And so it is not a question of whether you go with your black friends or white, but whether, by following either of them, you walk away into a comfort zone of belonging, thus dropping the issue as insoluble, or whether you stay with what you feel, awful as it is. If you stay with it, you find yourself trapped between the two alternatives I mentioned earlier: either you fit in quietly with what is expected of you (i.e. accept the policeman's authority), in which case your very silence supports the notion that blacks are fair game for racial abuse¹, or you rebel (against his abuse of that authority), in which case the denial that anything untoward is going on (“Just carrying out the law, sir”) casts *you* as the stereotyped, hypersensitive black person with a chip on their shoulder about race and too angry/reluctant to submit to the

rule of law. This is an agonizingly conflicted place to be in, but it is what being black in a white world involves psychically. It is the small change of daily life, sealed up within, which the black person has no choice but to live with, if not consciously then within the unconscious. Either way, you have been invaded, your peace of mind shattered. And, except for the lure of either comfort zone, you are stuck with it, utterly alone.

Racism Inside and Out

The above incidents took place in the outside world, but they produced profound effects internally. We can conclude, therefore, that racism exists *both* in the world *and* in the mind. In the world, racism's many forms are readily recognized and extend all the way from the grotesque horror of genocide – by the Nazis in Germany and Pol Pot in Cambodia, or more recently in Rwanda and Bosnia – and racist murders, race riots and so on at one extreme, to racial abuse, systematic prejudice and petty discrimination at the other. On this broad external canvas, racism is both recognized and publicly debated; it is also taken seriously as a subject of academic study in the social sciences.

More subtle dimensions of racist interchange, such as the ones I related above, are occasionally discussed publicly, but even then the frame of reference remains an external-world one. While their internal nature is indeed recognized, this tends to be seen as the inner experience of, say, institutional racism or of growing up as a second-generation immigrant. That is to say, although the subjective experience of racism is acknowledged, it is rarely taken seriously as a subject of psychological inquiry in its own right. Is it because they are so ordinary – who could not imagine, in a relaxed, unguarded moment, making a *faux pas* like the one Bhaskar relates? And who wants to be accused of being racist on account of that? The above incidents, however, make it plain that racist interchanges have the power to get inside us in a most disturbing way. Why should this be so? What makes the perpetrator – a friend in Bhaskar's case – carry out such an attack? What gives racist attacks the power to eat into one's being in this way? Why do they interfere so with our ordinary functioning? Why, in the grip of them, is it so difficult to break free and to keep hold of yourself – of what you think, feel or want, of what

was *you* before all of this came your way? What immobilizes the capacity to think?

If we return to the opening vignettes, the questions I have just raised require us to go beyond an external world perspective and move inwards into the psychoanalytic realm. The powerful and deeply disturbing impact of such interchanges is obvious. However, as I have already noted, confronting the assailant directly with what they are doing would get nowhere, eliciting either outright denial or utter incomprehension – the policeman was only doing his duty; Bhaskar’s friend was making a joke. Our first observation, therefore, is that the racist element runs outside of, and parallel to, ordinary conscious discourse – that is why our inquiry must be psychoanalytic rather than psychological. Secondly, it operates at a pre-verbal rather than verbal level: one is not inclined to reflect on or discuss the situation but is, instead, impelled to action – Bhaskar *reacted* as he was expected to; I did everything I could to suppress my reaction to the police officer. These observations point to the need for a psychoanalytic framework capable of shedding light on non-verbal modes of being.

Psychoanalysis and Racism: A Problematic Engagement

The need to address both external and internal dimensions of racism has been recognized for many years (e.g. Fenichel, 1946; Gordon, 1994b; Dalal, 1997). Over 50 years ago, Frantz Fanon argued that shedding light on “the anomalies of affect” (1952, p. 12) implicated in racism called for a psychoanalytic approach, whose models of the mind are theoretically sophisticated and thus “specifically” suited to that purpose (Bhugra and Bhui, 1998, p. 319). How far have we come?

For many years, progress was held up by an unseemly spat over the question of origins. While social scientists tended to see racism as originating in the world around us, clinicians tended to reduce it to psychological issues assumed to be primary. Racism towards the black man, for instance, was seen as stemming from hatred of the father as an Oedipal rival² (e.g. Rodgers, 1960). As the “real” psychological source of white hatred as Oedipal takes centre stage, the question of whether there is something specific in the relationship between white self and

culturally sanctioned black scapegoat fades out of focus – the black person is just one of many possible substitutes onto whom Oedipal hatred might be displaced. The racist object relationship is just not the real issue. Farhad Dalal (2002) argues that psychoanalytic models partial out racism through their neglect of the social. While his review of that literature is open to criticism (Davids, 2003a), this does not detract from his central point that clinicians continue to reduce race to more familiar psychological issues or conflicts assumed, a priori, to underpin it. While such an approach may “work” in the consulting room,³ it limits our ability to shed light on the *psychology* of racism, and may be a manifestation of institutional racism, in the form of an indifference to race, present in our profession at large (Thomas, 1992; Gordon, 1994b).

Joel Kovel’s (1988) comprehensive psychohistory of white racism, written whilst he was a psychoanalyst-in-training and first published in 1970, changed a landscape polarized between external and internal world perspectives. He demonstrated the ubiquity of racism in white American (and by extension, Western) society, showing how its roots in the conquest of the natives of that land, together with its extensive role in the slave trade – both predicated on dehumanization of the other – is a racist underbelly integral to the narrative of America as land of the free. He argues compellingly that the racism of our world is deeply embedded within us: “in a society such as ours, which has earned the dubious distinction of being called racist as such, racism marks each and every individual life” (Kovel, 2000, p. 583). This courageous and admired work (Young, 1994) has gradually come to serve as a counterweight to earlier, more conventional psychoanalytic views that either avoid race altogether or reduce it to an inner essence.

If, in a racist world, racism comes to mark every individual mind, psychoanalysts have a responsibility to investigate its origin, development and functioning within the wider psychic economy. That seems obvious, and yet, if we examine the psychoanalytic engagement with the subject, two problems become apparent. First, the recognition of a need for a *psychology* of racism appears ambivalent; second, when the psychology of racism is indeed investigated it is most often seen as “applied” psychoanalysis.

Ambivalence

In 2002, Farhad Dalal published an important book entitled *Race, Colour and the Processes of Racialisation: New Perspectives from Psychoanalysis, Group Analysis and Sociology*. The subtitle might lead us to expect an even-handed approach to external and internal dimensions of racism. However, whilst Dalal's historicized account of how racism arises out of an imperative to distinguish "haves" from "must-not-haves" – an external world perspective – is compelling, he does little justice to the inner world dimension. Instead, he argues that a psychology of racism can give the impression that racism originates from within, thereby obscuring the role of external, material forces in generating and maintaining it.

Dalal justifies stepping away from a *psychology* of racism by arguing that the mind is not a thing out there but an abstraction. He quotes the psychoanalyst and group analyst S. H. Foulkes:

The group, the community, is the ultimate primary unit of consideration, and the *so-called inner processes* in the individual are internalizations of the forces operating in the group to which he belongs. (Foulkes, 1971, p. 212, cited in Dalal, 2002, p. 114, Dalal's italics)

I think this is problematic. Theoretical constructs are, of course, abstractions, but to use this to argue that little can be gained from understanding the role of the mind in perpetuating racism, in giving it an individual lease of life, is unconvincing. One does not have to believe the mind has a material existence to do so because the *assumption* that one's object of study is real is necessary whatever the field of inquiry. Foulkes himself acknowledges as much:

The network of all individual processes [the matrix] – the psychological medium in which they meet, communicate and interact . . . is of course a construct – in the same way as . . . the mind. (Foulkes, 1966)

The test lies not in whether the mind is real or an abstraction, but in whether the inquiry into the role it plays in racism adds

to our understanding of the phenomenon. Dalal and, to a lesser extent, Foulkes prioritize the social as the locus of motivation, but I think this extends the earlier polarized debate over origins and places a fully worked out psychology of racism beyond reach. The price Dalal pays for this is that his model, which looks convincingly to the broader socio-historical-political realm to account for the origin and maintenance of racism, generates clinical interventions that are atheoretical, exceedingly thin and framed almost entirely in the language of consciousness (Dalal, 2002, pp. 216–227). Dalal's is an example of an ambivalent engagement with the inner dimensions of racism that is, sadly, widespread. This must, I think, raise the question of whether it reflects resistance to opening up the study of inner racism out of a fear of how uncomfortable and close to the bone it may be for all of us.

Applied Psychoanalysis

There is a fundamental problem with seeing race as an area of applied rather than “pure” clinical psychoanalysis. Applying pre-existing concepts to a new phenomenon is like photographing a new object from different vantage points. Whilst each picture yields an interesting new angle, the sum of them cannot substitute for a dissection of that object that would reveal its inner make-up.

At best, the applied approach presents us with psychoanalytic perspectives on race that may be rich and interesting but, in the final analysis, contribute more to psychoanalysis than they do to the understanding of racism. For example, Wulf Sachs' (1937) pioneering “analysis” of a black migrant worker in South Africa in the 1920s yielded fascinating data, but its scientific value lay in its ability to confirm, by demonstrating how they could be seen at work in the mind of a tribal black African, the universality of the central psychoanalytic concepts of the day. Likewise, Sherwood's (1980) rich study into racialized constructions of the other yielded a model of vicious and benign racial spirals. However, the model is neither a psychoanalytic nor a sociological one (Hopper, 1982); its psychoanalytic contribution is confined to showing that when, during adolescence, anxiety is greater the use of racialized categories in the outside world is more pernicious,

creating a destructive inner–outer spiral. Racial categories are external ones solving inner adolescent tension. The latter thus occupies the space where an inquiry into inner racism should be located, and the question of why *racial* categories should so attract the mind in its moment of desperation is not addressed. I hope even this brief discussion shows that the applied orientation does not equip us to maximize the learning about inner racism that lies dormant in the data of these excellent studies.

At worst, the applied approach leads to a plethora of illustrations of how “our” concepts can be demonstrated in racism. The drive theorist can show that sexuality and aggression are projected across the race divide, the Lacanian that the Other is embodied there, the Kleinian that primitive object relations are played out there and so on, each then referring back to its theoretical corpus to shed light on the phenomenon. Racism becomes the newest canvas on which our concepts are illustrated. The fact that being used for someone else’s purposes is such a central element in the experience of racism is an added incentive for calling this practice into question.

This Book

This book takes a fundamentally different approach, treating racism as a subject of proper clinical investigation in its own right. I am fortunate in that I am a brown-skinned immigrant whilst a number of my patients are of European origin, thus creating a cross-race/culture dyad in the consulting room. That is where my investigation begins.

My interest in this subject began in 1975 when, as a post-graduate psychology student in Cape Town, I discovered the work of Frantz Fanon. Fanon, whose work was banned during the apartheid years, speaks explicitly of the experience of being black in a racist milieu where power is white. My first response to him was emotional. It was an immense relief that an experience I was only barely aware of, and which was otherwise invisible in psychology – and that at a liberal, anti-apartheid university – was not only recognized but also articulated powerfully and without compromise. On the theoretical plane, Fanon (1952) was the first to make the case that a psychoanalytic inquiry is required to elucidate deeper elements of what he

termed the “black problem” – a particular version, in the black person living under colonialism, of what I now see as internal racism that is a universal feature of the human mind.

Juliet Mitchell’s *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1974), which had just been published, showed that a psychoanalytic inquiry could illuminate how another form of oppression in our world – that of women – comes to exist in a real and highly charged way deep in our minds, marked distinctively by our lived history. Because that oppression involves relationships across the gender divide, Mitchell could draw directly on the clinically validated theory of the Oedipus complex to address the links between mind and social context, yielding a rich, multi-layered and nuanced understanding. A suitable theory was not readily available as far as the racial divide is concerned, and Fanon’s own attempt to generate one, using the method of applied psychoanalysis, suffers on account of it. Drawing on subsequent developments, I shall flesh out one of his ideas – the epidermalization of inferiority – to give it psychological depth, showing how it can begin to deepen our appreciation of the mechanisms involved in internal racism, whilst still falling short of providing a fully worked-out general account of it. What is required is a psychoanalytic account that does for the race/class divide what the theory of the Oedipus complex does for the gender one.

The chapters in Part I develop an account of how racial difference is inscribed in the mind, the need for which is widely recognized (e.g. Leary, 2000). Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex was informed substantially by his self-analysis (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973). This made available a wealth of detailed data, ensuring that theory remained close to clinical observation. I follow this same path, beginning, in Chapter 2, with the description of a racist attack, which was sensed initially in the countertransference.⁴ Using detailed clinical material I show that it emanated from a defensive organization constructed around a racial difference between patient and analyst. I present two kinds of clinical fact (Tuckett, 1995) as evidence for this formulation – the patient’s here-and-now response to me, including my naming race as an element in the attack, and details that emerged from the subsequent analysis showing that the elements I suggest were assembled into the defensive organization were indeed present in the patient’s mind. The level of detail in the evidence I present is unusual today, when clinical research tends to investigate finer

details of psychoanalytic concepts whose general validity has already been established (Leuzinger-Bohleber and Fischmann, 2006). Since this is not the case as far as internal racism is concerned, treating them as such would risk reducing racism to *known* psychological categories, an issue I have already referred to. In Chapter 2, therefore, I resist my initial attempt to ignore race as a factor, returning to the clinical method of Freud's early case studies to show that it was indeed implicated in the attack, and that it emanated from a defensive organization.

Chapter 3 asks whether the existing concept of the pathological organization (Steiner, 1987) can account for the defensive system from which the attack emanated. I present further evidence to show that whilst this concept describes the operational features of the system, it does not take full account of the fact that it was a normal strategy, available to all, that aligns organized inner defence with social stereotyping in the outside world. This hides both its defensive nature and the cruel way in which it intrudes, through projection, into the racial other. I suggest we call this normal variant an internal racist organization to distinguish it from its pathological counterpart.

It would, of course, be irresponsible to add needlessly to the plethora of concepts that already litter the psychoanalytic landscape. In Chapter 3, I therefore consider what further evidence there is to support the proposition of an internal racist organization in the mind. Since this involves our theory of normal development and functioning, it calls for a metapsychological inquiry, which falls into the category of conceptual research in contemporary psychoanalysis (Leuzinger-Bohleber and Fischmann, 2006; Wallerstein, 2009). I draw on developmental evidence as well as observations in the wider world to support the idea, and show it to be continuous with the existing body of psychoanalytic knowledge of the mind, into which I integrate it.

The material in Chapter 2 allowed me to investigate in detail the dynamics of internal racism and its place in the mind via the analysis of an opportunistically constructed racist defence – if the clinician were not black, the patient would have used an alternative. It cannot therefore support the idea that a racist organization exists, over time, as a stable defensive entity as I contend. Chapter 4 returns to the clinical arena to bring evidence of such a defensive arrangement, which had gone unrecognized in a previous analysis.

If the racist organization functions like a pathological organization, we would expect a patient to cling as tenaciously to it as more disturbed patients do to the latter. Again, the material from the patient in Chapter 2 could not demonstrate this – because of the seriousness of his disturbance, mention of the loaded race dimension brought about a descent into a paranoid mindset. The material in Chapter 5 corrects this omission, describing the quality of engagement involved in accessing internal racism. If internal racism exists in every normal mind, as I contend, one might expect it to come to the surface in a group mind created when individuals gather to face their racism, the task of the group on which I report in this chapter. The material shows both the difficulty of the struggle and, from a theoretical point of view, that the work was located between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive mindsets (Segal, 1964; Steiner, 1987). The fluidity of this work supports my contention that the racist defence exists in a normal mind, making available the ego's normal capacities in the difficult task of facing one's internal racism. This chapter concludes the section in which I bring forward detailed clinical evidence to support the validity of the concept of internal racism.

Part II reviews previous psychoanalytic attempts to engage with the psychology of racism. It begins with a chapter on Frantz Fanon's contribution. Fanon's critique of Mannoni's reductionism helps to focus the debate and to sketch out a background orientation on the relationship between psychoanalysis and social context that forms a backdrop to my own inquiry into internal racism. I go on to examine how the discipline has approached the topics of anti-Semitism and white–black racism, showing that although the need for a clinically led inquiry – as distinct from applied psychoanalysis – was recognized very early on, this has proved exceptionally hard to come by. If, as I suggest, internal racism is a normal part of the mind, it may be that it bedevils our attempts, as a discipline, to engage fully with the topic. In Chapter 8, I look specifically, for example, at the equation between the brown skin and the colour of faeces to highlight this. Nonetheless, it will become apparent that the model I propose can be seen as a development of trends that have been emerging over the past two decades or so. A more disturbed element implicated in racism – sometimes described as narcissistic or borderline involvement – has increasingly been recognized, as

has the need for clinicians to deal with their own racism to be clinically effective. However, the implications of these isolated observations for a coherent theory of internal racism have not, hitherto, been fully recognized.

The book ends with Part III, where I apply the concept of internal racism to instances of racism in the outside world. The material and evidence brought forward here is of a different order from that in Part I, where the evidence had to support the validity of the construct of internal racism. Here the material *illustrates* how internal racist themes can be recognized in institutions in the outside world, where it can illuminate the phenomenon of institutional racism (Chapter 9). Elsewhere, I have taken the same approach in trying to identify internal racist themes in the emergence of Islamophobia post-9/11 (Davids, 2006a).

Applications such as these raise the question of whether it would help to address the internal racist strand. An understanding of what form such interventions might take, and whether they would make a difference, must await further investigation. However, it is worth noting that psychic forces are not the only ones, or perhaps even the decisive ones, that operate within our broader world; changing racist mindsets will almost certainly require intervention beyond the psychological. Understanding the nature of the psychological processes implicated in this is, I think, an indispensable part of the work. I hope this book goes some way towards addressing this need.

Terminology: The “Racial Other”

This book explores the internal relationship between self and “other” of social stereotyping. I wish I could simply call that figure “the other”, but that term is already taken, twice over.

Developmentally, the first other is encountered whilst the infant is wholly dependent on at least one other for survival. If things go well in this relationship, usually with the mother, a self more or less successfully differentiated from other ensues. Difficulties arising at this stage affect one’s capacity for object relatedness itself, and thus impact on all relationships. The self–other relationship involved in social stereotyping is not an instance of something so general.

The second other is the third object, conceptually the father, encountered in the Oedipal situation. If the other of social stereotyping corresponded to this figure, difficulties in that relationship would correspond neatly to those between gendered self and other, which they don't (see Chapter 6, pp. 124–134). I therefore use the term “racial other” for the other of social stereotyping. It is arbitrary and inaccurate since social stereotyping is not confined to race alone, as I will discuss. However, it has the advantage of keeping company with a plethora of powerful meanings absolutely relevant to our study, which are instantly evoked by the term “racial”. Short of inventing a new term, I can think of nothing better.